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Abstract
Dynastic politicians, who are defined as those whose family members have also served for the
same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of political offices in many parts of the
world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages
affect electoral outcomes and policy choices on distributive benefits. Our model predicts the
following; (1) dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district than non-dynastic
legislators; (2) dynastic candidates enjoy a higher probability of winning and a higher vote
share than non-dynastic candidates; (3) districts electing dynastic legislators display lower
economic performance despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring because
dynastic legislators spend the distribution for a small fraction of people in the district. We
test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Do the types of politicians matter in the democratic political process? Do politicians with
distinct characteristics generate particular policy outcomes? This paper answers these ques-
tions by studying how dynastic politicians with inherited political resources affect electoral
competitiveness and policy outcomes.
It is widely known that institutional structures constrain actions of elected officials. For
example, electoral systems produce incentives that induce elected officials to represent certain
constituencies and to allocate particular types of resources (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Other
types of institutional features (e.g., the forms of government, and the degree of decentralization)
have also been shown to produce significantly different incentives for elected officials, which
would result in different policy outcomes (Lijphart, 1999).
Less is known about how the types of elected officials affect policy choices. As Besley (2005)
and Jones and Olken (2005) point out, implicit in most of the previous work is the assumption
that politicians act in a similar fashion under a certain institutional rule, no matter who they
are. In other words, previous research neglects the possibility that personal characteristics of
politicians also constrain their actions in the democratic policy-making process, which then
affect policies. As Key (1949, 10) notes, “the nature of the working of government depends
ultimately on the men who run it. The men we elect to office and the circumstances we create
that affect their work determine the nature of popular government.”
Politicians differ along a variety of dimensions such as their preferences and competence
(Besley, 2005). Previous research has found that policy preferences reflected in politician’s
identity such as gender and race are associated with particular policy choices (Chattopadhyay
and Duflo, 2004; Lublin, 1997). The personal ideology of the members of U.S. Congress plays a
pivotal role in their roll-call voting patterns (Levitt, 1996). Political competence of politicians
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refers to the ability to achieve desired policies at a minimum social cost (Caselli and Morelli,
2004) and is equivalent to individual abilities required for certain non-political jobs (Besley,
2005).1 In fact, Jones and Olken (2005) show that some national leaders have the ability to
achieve a higher rate of economic growth.
This paper focuses on another dimension of personal features that characterize politicians.
Specifically, we study dynastic politicians with inherited political resources. Political positions
are no longer hereditary in modern democracies, but political dynasties continue to exist.
Some democracies allow for “the de facto inheritance of political power” (Dal Bo, Dal Bo,
and Snyder, 2009, 116). Dynastic politicians, whose family members have also held similar
political positions in the past, have occupied a sizable portion of political offices in many parts
of the world.2 Despite the persistence of political dynasties in many democratic countries,
little is known about the political consequences of dynastic legislators. Does the presence of
political dynasties have any impact on electoral competitiveness and policy outcomes? If so,
how? What is an normative implication of their presence for the democratic political process?
Only a few prior studies offer answers to these questions. Using data on political dynasties
in the United States, Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2009) show that legislators who served for
multiple terms have a high probability that their relatives are elected for the same office in the
future. This is partly because political capital, such as name recognition and ties with political
machines, can be inherited within families. Feinstein (2010) shows that dynastic politicians
1Besley (2005, 48) notes that political competence “could include intangible leadership skills, like persuading others
in debate or inspiring trust, and also more standard analytical skills, such as spotting flaws in policy proposals.”
2In the United States, Hess (1966, 1) notes that “there have been some 700 families in which two or more members
served in Congress, and they account for nearly 1,700 of the 10,000 men and women who have been elected to the
federal legislature since 1774.” The proportion of dynastic legislators has decreased over the years (Clubok, Wilensky
and Berghorn, 1969), yet even after the 1960s, 7 percent of the U.S. House members can still be classified as dynastic
(Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder, 2009). In Japan, about one third of the legislators in the Lower House between 1970
and 2000 had relatives who served in the national parliament (Ishibashi and Reed, 1992; Taniguchi, 2008). Another
example is Mexico, where 20 to 40 percent of politicians at the national level have family ties to other politicians
(Camp, 1982, 1995). In Italy, some famous politicians are the relatives of other politicians (Chirico and Lupoli,
2008), and both the Philippines and India have a sizeable number of dynastic politicians in their parliaments.
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receive an additional 4 percent increase in the two-party vote share in congressional elections
because of their “brand name advantage.”
This paper offers a new theory and evidence for the political consequences of dynastic
politicians. We ask whether dynastic politicians with electoral and bargaining advantages
undermine the role of electoral competition as a device for achieving desirable policies for
the citizens. While Dal Bo et al. (2009) and Feinstein (2010) focus on an empirical test
for the impacts of dynastic politicians on election outcomes, we develop a formal model of
dynastic politicians and then empirically test a few implications from the model. Another
notable feature of this paper is that we examine the influence of dynastic politicians on a
variety of political consequences such as electoral competitiveness, policy choices, and economic
performance.
The first part of this paper develops a model that shows when dynastic candidates with
inherited electoral and bargaining advantages crowd out non-dynastic candidates and how their
dynastic status affects policy decisions on distributive benefits. Our model combines the citizen
candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) and the legislative
bargaining model (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989).3 We assume that dynastic politicians enjoy
higher bargaining power and the lower cost of running for office. Building on these assumptions,
our model predicts the following; (1) dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district
than non-dynastic legislators; (2) dynastic candidates enjoy a higher probability of winning
and a higher vote share than non-dynastic candidates; (3) districts electing dynastic legislators
display lower economic performance despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they
3Our model differs from existing related models in a notable way. In a similar effort to explain the role of
candidate types, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Gehlbach, Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2010) use the framework
of the citizen candidate model, but their models do not contain legislative bargaining. McKelvey and Riezman (1992)
also study candidates with legislative advantages using the legislative bargaining model, but they do not consider
endogenous candidates. Morelli (2004) combines the citizen candidate model with the legislative bargaining model,
but candidates all belong to the same type in his model, while our model considers two different types of candidates.
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bring because dynastic legislators spend the distribution for a small fraction of people in the
district.
The second part of the paper offers an empirical test for the predictions from the model
using data on Japanese politicians. Japan is an ideal case for this study for three reasons. First,
dynastic legislators occupy a sizable portion of the Parliament. In addition, there is ample
variation in the geographical and temporal distributions of dynastic politicians. Second, data
on politicians’ family background are readily available. Third, detailed data on fiscal transfers,
election outcomes, and economic growth are available, which enables us to test the predictions
of the model. Our analysis using an instrumental variable shows that dynastic politicians
deliver a larger amount of distributive benefits to their districts, compared to non-dynastic
politicians. We also find that the presence of dynastic legislators suppresses the level of electoral
competition and that dynastic legislators with abundant electoral resources lower the rate of
economic growth in their districts.
2 The Model
This section presents a simple model of how dynastic legislators with inherited resources affect
electoral competitiveness and policy choices. Suppose that there are two potential candidates
in the district, and they decide to run or not for office.4 One of them is a dynastic candidate,
and another potential candidate is non-dynastic. We will discuss other cases later. There is
also a size one continuum of voters. Candidates who decide to run announce their campaign
platforms before the election. Voters cast a vote on one of the candidates. A winning candidate
4When three or more candidates run, it is well known that analytical solutions to such probabilistic models of
multi-candidate competition do not generally exist or are very difficult to derive (See Adams et.al. (2005)). Moreover,
in past studies based on a citizen candidate framework, equilibria tend to feature one or two candidates only. Thus,
we consider only two potential candidates in order to simplify the analysis.
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negotiates in the legislature to obtain a distribution of government transfers for the district.
The legislator spends this distribution on policies in the district.5
2.1 Policy
Once elected, legislators bargain in the legislature over a distribution of benefits. Suppose
that the legislature has odd L ≥ 3 members, who are elected from L districts. At the begin-
ning of the legislative process, one of the L legislators is chosen as an agenda setter with the
probability pl, where
L∑
l=1
pl = 1. Assume that non-dynastic legislators have the same proba-
bility of becoming an agenda setter, pN , while the probability for dynastic legislators is given
by pD = αpN . The value of α captures the bargaining power of dynastic legislators in the
legislature when the power of non-dynastic legislators is normalized to one.
We assume that dynastic legislators have a bargaining advantage and therefore that α > 1.
This assumption captures a few distinctive features of dynastic legislators. First, dynastic
legislators are in the position to inherit personal ties with other political figures, such as
party leaders, bureaucrats and special interest groups from their parent. Second, dynastic
legislators are likely to be more knowledgeable on the process of policy-making non-dynastic
counterparts because they can receive information from their parent. These features allow
dynastic legislators to climb up the ladder of party hierarchy faster and enjoy larger bargaining
power, in comparison to non-dynastic legislators.
The agenda setter proposes distribution d = (d1, ..., dL) of the pool of nonnegative distribu-
tive benefits, where
L∑
l=1
dl = 1 where dl ≥ 0. Legislators then vote to approve or reject d, where
d is adopted if (L− 1)/2 legislators approve it. If the proposal is approved, legislators receive
the distribution of benefits specified in the proposal. If it is defeated, a default distribution is
5All variables are summarized in Appendix 1.
5
implemented, and we assume that this default is zero without loss of generality. We consider
the ultimatum game with a closed rule as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Our result can hold
even if the infinitely repeated game is considered, as discussed below.
Legislators spend a distribution of benefits from the legislature in their districts. Suppose
that legislators allocate the distribution to policy x and y where x + y = dl in district l.
Policy x will benefit all voters, and the payoff for each voter is x. Since we consider a size
one continuum of voters, the sum of the all citizens’ payoff is also x. In contrast, policy y
benefits only a fraction η < 1/2 of the voters, and the total benefit is y. Since η of a size one
continuum of voters share the benefits y, the payoff for each voter in this group is y/η. We
call policy y as rents, but we can interpret policy y as a distorted policy preferred only by the
small segment of voters.
We assume that x = (1− λ)d, and y = λβd where 0 < β < 1. The value of λ ∈ [0, 1] is the
ratio of rents. That is, policy y is less efficient than policy x since the marginal productivity
of policy y is 0 < β < 1 while the marginal productivity of policy x is one. Suppose
β
η
>
1 > β > 0. While the marginal benefit for each voter from policy x is 1, the marginal benefit
for each voter in the small segment is β/η since the payoff from policy y for one of them is
y/η = βd/η. Therefore, it is optimal for the supporting group of voters that benefit from the
rent to set λ = 1, yet the average utility for all voters in the district is higher when λ = 0.
Denote dD and dN as the expected amount of distributive benefits delivered by dynastic
and non-dynastic candidates (at the beginning of this game), and λD and λN as the ratio of
rents chosen by dynastic and non-dynastic candidates respectively.
6
2.2 Election
There are two types of voters in a district: independent voters and voters who belong to
candidates’ support group. Both potential candidates, dynastic and non-dynastic, have their
own supporting group, and voters in the group prefer their candidate regardless of their policy.
We assume that a fraction of voters in each group (η) is the same for both candidates, thus
the pivotal voter is independent voters. In the following parts, we ignore the role of voters in
the support groups, and analyze only independent voters who are referred to as “voters.”6
Voters vote sincerely; thus they play only weakly undominated strategies. Suppose that
both types of candidates run. Voters’ payoff from a candidate depends on two items; the
size of policy x and the type of candidates. Voter i’s payoff is defined as (1 − λD)dD + ωi
when a dynastic candidate wins and (1 − λN )dN when a non-dynastic candidate wins. If
(1−λD)dD = (1−λN )dN , voter i prefers a dynastic candidate when ωi > 0, and prefers a non-
dynastic candidate when ωi < 0.
7 We assume that ωi is uniformly distributed on [γ− 12φ , γ+ 12φ ].
An aggregate popularity shock γ is uniformly distributed on [− 12ξ , 12ξ ]. Voter i casts a ballot
for a dynastic candidate whenever ωi + (1− λD)dD − (1− λN )dN > 0, so the (random) share
of voters who support a dynastic candidate is φ[(1− λD)dD − (1− λN )dN + γ + 12φ ].
Using this parameterization, the condition for the victory of a dynastic candidate, assuming
an interior solution, is φ[(1 − λD)dD − (1 − λN )dN + γ + 12φ ] > 12 . This condition can be
rewritten as γ > −((1 − λD)dD − (1 − λN )dN ). The probability that a dynastic candidate
wins is denoted as pi(λD, λN ), and pi(λD, λN ) = 1 if ξ((1 − λD)dD − (1 − λN )dN ) > 1/2, and
pi(λD, λN ) = 0 if ξ((1 − λD)dD − (1 − λN )dN ) < −1/2. In other cases, pi(λD, λN ) = 1/2+
6If the sizes of candidates’ support groups (η) are asymmetric between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates, a
candidate who has a larger support group has an advantage in elections. This paper ignores such an effect as it has
been already studied by Besley, Persson and Sturn (2010).
7The variable ωi can be interpreted as not only voter i’s preference on a dynastic characteristic but also voter i’s
preference on dynastic candidate’s valence (personality etc.) or party which this dynastic candidate belongs to.
7
ξ((1 − λD)dD − (1 − λN )dN ). If only one candidate runs, voters vote on this candidate, and
this candidate wins with certainty.
Candidates are office-motivated and a rent seeker. The benefit from holding office is v > 0
which is not related to policy. They obtain a part of rents by implementing policy y = βλd.
We assume that candidates can obtain y/η if they win and obtain the positive amount of
distribution from the legislature. The value of y/η is the benefit on one voter in the supporting
group from policy y, and it is possible to interpret as the payment to a politician from a
supporting group. Note that even if candidates obtain positive benefit but not exactly same as
y/η, the result does not change when it depends on y. Candidates announce λ before voting
and they can commit to it. Therefore, the expected payoffs of dynastic and non-dynastic
candidates are;
pi(λD, λN )
(
β
η
λDdD + v
)
, (1)
(1− pi(λD, λN ))
(
β
η
λNdN + v
)
. (2)
Dynastic and Non-dynastic candidates have to pay the cost of running cD and cN re-
spectively. We assume that the cost is higher for non-dynastic candidates than for dynastic
candidates, i.e., cD < cN . This assumption is drawn from some observable features of dy-
nastic candidates. First, dynastic candidates can inherit a well-organized supporting group
from their parent. The supporting group helps candidates mobilize voters in elections. Sec-
ond, dynastic candidates can inherit financial resources from their parent. Third, the name
of dynastic candidates is well recognized by constituents (Feinstein, 2010).8 These advantages
8Scholars who study Japanese politics argue that dynastic legislators possess three types of advantages in elections:
”jiban (base constituency),” ”kaban (financial resources)” and ”kanban (name recognition)” which means the above
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decrease the cost of running for dynastic candidates, while they increase the cost of running for
non-dynastic candidates who compete with dynastic candidates. We call this assumption the
electoral advantage. We also assume cN <
β
η
1
4ξ2
. This assumption means that both candidates
have an incentive to run if α = 1.
We consider a subgame perfect equilibrium. The timing of the game is summarized as
follows:
1. Two potential candidates decide to run or not.
2. Candidates who decide to run announce a campaign platform, λ.
3. Voters choose one of the candidates. A winner is decided by a plurality rule, with ties
being settled using an equal-probability rule. If only one candidate runs for office in the
district, this candidate wins with certainty.
4. Elected legislators bargain over a distribution of benefits.
(a) Nature decides an agenda setter.
(b) The agenda setter offers a proposal.
(c) The legislators vote to approve or reject the proposal. If it is approved, the proposal
is implemented. If not, the distribution for each district is zero.
5. The legislator spends the distribution on policy x and y.
2.3 Legislative Bargaining
Legislative bargaining is analyzed first. We consider an ultimatum game; if a proposal is not
approved, the game ends, and each member receives zero. In this case, the agenda setter
proposes to keep all the resources, and other members approve it (see Proposition 1 of Baron
characteristics respectively.
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and Ferejohn (1989)). Therefore, the expected value of distribution for the district is the same
as the probability of being an agenda setter. Let dmj be the expected amount of distribution,
where m ≤ L is the number of dynastic legislators in the legislature, and j ∈ {D,N} is
the legislator’s type, dynastic (D) or non-dynastic (N). This is the expected value after
the number of dynastic candidates m is decided (so at the beginning of period 3). Then,
pN = d
m
N =
1
L+ (α− 1)m and pD = d
m
D =
α
L+ (α− 1)m .
The district with a dynastic legislator has a greater expected amount of distributions than
the one with a non-dynastic legislator. That is, dmD > d
m
N for any 0 < m < L. As α increases,
dmD increases and d
m
N decreases: i.e., the larger bargaining power of dynastic legislators results
in the larger allocation of benefits for their districts than for non-dynastic legislators’ districts.
Even if the game is infinitely repeated, the allocation of benefits to each legislator is non-
decreasing in the probability of being an agenda setter under a stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium (Eraslan, 2002). Therefore, dmD ≥ dmN even if the repeated model is introduced,
and we consider only an ultimatum game to avoid multi-equilibria.9
The actual bargaining advantage of a dynastic candidate can be represented by dmD −dmN =
α−1
L+(α−1)m . This value decreases as m and L increases (and α decreases). In words, when the
number of dynastic legislator or the total number of legislators in the legislature increases, the
actual bargaining advantage of dynastic candidates decreases.
If 0 < pi(xD, xN ) < 1, the number of dynastic legislators is uncertain at period 1. Denote
dD and dN as the expected amount of distribution at period 1 of dynastic and non-dynastic
candidates, respectively. In this case, the values of dD and dN are affected by strategies of
candidates in other district. However, we ignore such interactions among districts in order to
9If we suppose unanimity rule, dmN =
1
L+ (α− 1)m and d
m
D =
α
L+ (α− 1)m when the game is infinitely repeated
according to Eraslan (2002). When the bargaining game is finitely repeated, the result depends on the number of
repetition (Norman, 2002). This suggests that a finitely repeated game is not appropriate for our research question.
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simplify the analysis, and the probability that a dynastic candidate wins in other districts is
treated as given. Even though m is uncertain, dmD > d
m
N for any 0 < m < L, thus we can
conclude dD > dN .
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2.4 Campaign Platform
We assume that
1
3
(dD − dN ) < 1
2ξ
− η
β
v <
1
3
(dD + 2dN ) (3)
In other words, the value of ξ is not too high or too low. With this assumption, an equilibrium
is an interior solution. That is, λj ∈ (0, 1) for j = D,N and pi(λD, λN ) ∈ (0, 1).
Differentiating (1) and (2) by λD and λN , and, from some calculations, we derive the
following values of λ announced by candidates in equilibrium:
λD =
1
3
− 1
dD
[
η
β
v − 1
2ξ
+
1
3
dN
]
, (4)
λN =
1
3
− 1
dN
[
η
β
v − 1
2ξ
+
1
3
dD
]
. (5)
If the opponent obtains a more distribution, then the candidate decreases λ; i.e., the candidate
gives up rents. When candidates are more uncertain about voters’ preference (lower ξ), the
probability of winning does not increase so much even though candidates decrease λ, so they
10To be precise, dN =
∫ L
0
pi(λD, λN )
m(1 − pi(λD, λN ))L−m 1L+(α−1)mdm and dD =
∫ L
0
pi(λD, λN )
m(1 −
pi(λD, λN ))
L−m α
L+(α−1)mdm. Suppose that m dynastic legislators are elected from other L − 1 districts. If the
remaining district elects a dynastic candidate, then there are total m + 1 dynastic legislators in the legislature.
If the remaining district elects a non-dynastic candidate, then there are total m dynastic legislators. Thus, dN =∫ L−1
0
pi(λD, λN )
m(1−pi(λD, λN ))L−m 1L+(α−1)mdm and dD =
∫ L−1
0
pi(λD, λN )
m(1−pi(λD, λN ))L−m αL+(α−1)(m+1)dm.
We have dD > dN , if
α
L+(α−1)(m+1) >
1
L+(α−1)m for all m. It can be rewritten as α− 1 > α−1L+(α−1)m , so it is always
satified. As a result, the decision on λD and λN in one district do not affect on the above values of dD and dN , and
it is always dD > dN .
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set higher λ. The probability that a dynastic candidate wins is;
pi(λD, λN ) =
1
2
+
ξ
3
[dD − dN ] . (6)
The expected vote share is 1/2 + φ(dD − dN )/3 since the mean of γ is zero. Denote Vj is the
expected payoff of type-j candidate. They are:
VD =
β
η
[
1
2ξ
+
1
3
(dD − dN )
]2
, (7)
VN =
β
η
[
1
2ξ
− 1
3
(dD − dN )
]2
. (8)
Thus, the ratio of rents, the probability of winning, the expected vote share and the expected
payoff are higher for a dynastic candidate since dD > dN .
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2.5 Endogenous Candidates
Building on the analyses in the previous sections, this subsection examines the decision to run
for potential candidates and derive conditions for equilibria. First, suppose that nobody runs
in the district. A dynastic candidate has an incentive to run since βη
1
4ξ2
< βη dD + v. Thus,
such an equilibrium does not exist.
Second, suppose that only a dynastic candidate runs. This candidate will spend all of the
distribution as own rents (λD = 1), and win with certainty, so the expected payoff is
β
η dD + v.
Note that we assume cD < cN <
β
η
1
4ξ2
. This dynastic candidate has no incentive to deviate
11What happens if the assumption in (3) does not hold? If 13 (dD − dN ) ≥ 12ξ − ηβ v, a non-dynastic candidate
announces λN = 0 (and λD > 0). If − 13 (dD−dN ) ≥ 12ξ− ηβ v, λD = 0. When the value of ξ is too high, the probability
of winning increases a lot with a slight decrease of λ, so candidates set λ = 0. If 13 (dD+2dN ) <
1
2ξ− ηβ v < 13 (2dD+dN ),
λN = 1 and λD < 1. If
1
3 (2dD +dN ) <
1
2ξ − ηβ v, λN = λD = 1. When ξ is too low, even though a candidate decreases
the value of λ, the probability of winning does not increase so much. Thus, they do not want to decrease λ.
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(i.e., not run) since cD <
β
η
1
4ξ2
< βη dD + v. If a non-dynastic candidate deviates and runs, the
payoff of this candidate changes from zero to VN − cN . Therefore, if VN < cN , a non-dynastic
candidate does not run, and an equilibrium exists. This equilibrium is named the dynastic
equilibrium in which only a dynastic candidate runs and wins.12
Third, suppose that both dynastic and non-dynastic candidates run. If the non-dynastic
candidate deviates to abstain, her expected payoff becomes zero. Thus, if VN ≥ cN , both of
the candidates do not deviate since VD > VN ≥ cN > cD. This equilibrium is named the
competitive equilibrium. The conditions for the equilibria are summarized in Figure 1.13
[Figure 1 Here]
Proposition 1 1. If VN < cN , the dynastic equilibrium exists: Only a dynastic candidate
who announces λD = 1 runs and wins with certainty.
2. If VN ≥ cN , the competitive equilibrium exists: Both dynastic and non-dynastic candi-
dates run, and they announce λD and λN defined by (4) and (5). The probability of
winning for the dynastic candidate is defined by (6).
The above analysis indicates that the dynastic equilibrium rests heavily on the assumption
that dynastic candidates have an bargaining advantage. If a dynastic candidate has no bar-
gaining advantage (α = 1), then dD = dN and VD = VN =
β
η
1
4ξ2
. In Figure 1, if VN =
β
η
1
4ξ2
,
there is no area with the dynastic equilibrium since we assume cN ≤ βη 14ξ2 .14 As a result,
12Suppose that only a non-dynastic candidate runs. This candidate will set λN = 1, and win with certainty, so
the expected payoff is βη dN + v. If a dynastic candidate deviates and runs, the dynastic candidate’s payoff changes
from zero to VD − cD. Since we assume cN ≤ βη 14ξ2 , cD < cN ≤ βη 14ξ2 < VD. Thus, a dynastic candidate always have
an incentive to deviate to run, so such an equilibrium never exist.
13What happens if cN >
β
η
1
4ξ2
? If cD ≥ βη dD + v, no one has an incentive to run, so assume cD < βη dD + v. Then,
the dynastic equilibrium always exists. At the same time, if cN <
β
η dN + v and cD > VD, there exists an equilibrium
in which only non-dynastic candidate runs, sets λN = 1 and wins with certainty. However, such a non-dynastic
equilibrium is a rare case.
14If cN >
β
η
1
4ξ2
, a non-dynastic candidate does not run even if α = 1 when a dynastic candidate runs. Therefore,
if the cost of running is very high for a non-dynastic candidate, it can be the reason to have a dynastic equilibrium.
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a non-dynastic candidate always finds an incentive to run even though the cost of running
is higher than that of a dynastic candidate (cN > cD). On the other hand, if a dynastic
candidate has a bargaining advantage (α > 1) but no electoral advantage (cN = cD), there
still exists an area with the dynastic equilibrium in Figure 1. Yet, the electoral advantage still
plays an important role for the dynastic equilibrium. Suppose that a dynastic candidate has
no electoral advantage or that a non-dynastic candidate has the advantage. In this case, the
size of an area with the dynastic equilibrium in Figure 1 becomes smaller than the area with
the competitive equilibrium.
Finally, we consider a case where there is no dynastic candidate, and two potential non-
dynastic candidates decide to run or not. Since we assume cN ≤ βη 14ξ2 , there exists an equi-
librium where both of non-dynastic candidates run.15 These candidates’ expected amounts of
distributions should be identical. Thus, if two non-dynastic candidates run, the probabilities
of winning are equal (=1/2) from (6). The expected payoffs are also the same, and equal to
β
η
1
4ξ2
− cN from (8). They set λN = 1dN
[
1
2ξ − ηβ v
]
from (5). This equilibrium is called the non-
dynastic equilibrium in which two non-dynastic candidates run and win with the probability
1/2. The result is almost identical if there are two potential dynastic candidates in a district.
2.6 Theoretical Implications
2.6.1 Fiscal Transfers
We can draw three hypotheses from our model. First, our model of legislative bargaining
predicts that dynastic legislators can bring more distributions to the district than non-dynastic
15If only one non-dynastic candidate runs, this candidate will set λN = 1, and the expected payoff is
β
η dN + v.
If another non-dynastic candidate deviates to run, this new non-dynastic candidate’s payoff changes from zero to
β
η
1
4ξ2
− cN ≥ 0, so another candidate always deviates and runs. If no one runs, a non-dynastic candidate has an
incentive to deviate and run since cN ≤ βη 14ξ2 < βη dN + v.
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legislators since dynastic legislators have larger bargaining power. With this prediction, we
compare the amount of fiscal transfers delivered by dynastic and non-dynastic candidates.
H1 Dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district than non-dynastic legislators.
2.6.2 Election Returns
The probability that a dynastic candidate wins under the competitive equilibrium is given by
(6), which is always higher than 1/2. The expected vote share is 1/2 +φ(dD−dN )/3 since the
mean of γ is zero. On the other hand, the probability of winning of non-dynastic candidates
under the competitive equilibrium is lower than 1/2. Under the dynastic equilibrium, a dynas-
tic candidate will win with certainty. Finally, the probability that a non-dynastic candidate
wins under the non-dynastic equilibrium is exactly 1/2. Drawing on these results, we expect
the following:
H2 Dynastic candidates enjoy a higher probability of winning and higher vote shares than
non-dynastic candidates.
2.6.3 Policy Outcomes
Suppose that the welfare function of a district is the sum of the utilities of all citizens, that is;
W (λj , dj) = (1− λj)dj + βλjdj . (9)
The district welfare is a decreasing function of λj and an increasing function of dj .
16 A dynastic
candidate is defined “good” for the district if the district welfare is higher with a dynastic
candidate than with a non-dynastic candidate. On the other hand, a dynastic candidate is
16We ignore the benefit from holding office and the cost of running.
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defined “bad” for the district if the district welfare is lower with a dynastic candidate than
with a non-dynastic candidate. In the competitive equilibrium, a dynastic candidate is good
since (1−λD)dD > (1−λN )dN . In contrast, in the dynastic equilibrium, a dynastic candidate
can be either good or bad, but we predict that a dynastic candidate is most likely to be bad
because a dynastic candidate sets λD = 1 and wins.
17 In short, our model predicts that the
welfare is lower in districts with a bad dynastic legislator elected as a result of the dynastic
equilibrium than in districts with a non-dynastic legislator elected as a result of the competitive
or non-dynastic equilibrium. In contrast, the welfare is higher in districts with a good dynastic
legislator elected as a result of the competitive equilibrium than in districts with a non-dynastic
legislator.18
To compare the level of welfare across districts empirically, we need to work on two ad-
ditional issues. First, we have to specify which equilibrium appears in districts electing a
dynastic legislator. According to Proposition 1, which equilibrium appears depends on the
sizes of VN and cN . We focus on the role of cN , arguing that the dynastic equilibrium appears
more likely as cN is sufficiently high.
19 In contrast, the competitive equilibrium appears more
likely as cN is low. We assume that the value of cN is set higher if a dynastic candidate enjoy
abundant electoral resources. This is because a non-dynastic candidate has to spend more
17For example, in the dynastic equilibrium, if dD is very high such that βdD > (1− λN )dN + βλNdN , a dynastic
candidate is better for the distract than a non-dynastic candidate. In other cases, a dynastic candidate is always
“bad.” This is true when we compare the dynastic equilibrium with the competitive equilibrium as well as the
non-dynastic equilibrium.
18Moreover, even if a dynastic candidate may be desirable for a particular district, a dynastic candidate is not
desirable for the nation. The total amount of resources to be distributed for districts is limited. Even in the
competitive equilibrium, dynastic candidates spend a distribution on a distorted policy more than non-dynastic
candidates do. At the national level, therefore, if the legislature includes more dynastic legislators, more resources
will be spent on a distorted policy. Thus, the overall welfare of the nation decreases. This result is important when
we consider the normative implication of the presence of dynastic politicians.
19From (8), the value of VN depends on four parameters such as β, η, ξ and dD − dN , all of which are difficult to
observe. In contrast, the value of cN is observable using data. As discussed in the subsection 2.2, the values of cN
and cD are determined by three variables, such as inherited supporting group, financial resources and the name of
dynastic candidates. Among them, we focus on the amount of financial resources.
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for mobilization to challenge the dynastic opponent with rich resources. In short, we predict
that the dynastic equilibrium appears when dynastic candidates are more resourceful, while
the competitive equilibrium appears when dynastic candidates are less resourceful.
Second, we have to operationalize the district welfare. For our empirical analysis, we
interpret policy x and y as economic policies and assume that the way dD or dN is spent
affects the economic well-being of the district.20 Our interpretation seems reasonable because
fiscal transfers are often aimed at improving socioeconomic infrastructures and expanding job
opportunities in the district. Thus, the distributive benefits are spent on economic policies x
and y, which in turn affect economic well-being of citizens in the district. For example, x can
be a growth policy while y is an anti-growth policy. Under this interpretation, the district
welfare (9) is approximated by economic performance of the entire district. Building on this
interpretation, we develop the following hypothesis:
H3 Compared to districts electing non-dynastic legislators, districts electing dynastic legis-
lators with abundant resources display lower economic performance. On the other hand,
districts electing dynastic legislators without abundant resources display higher economic
performance.
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
For empirical tests, we use data on Japanese politicians. The data sources and summary
statistics are presented in the appendix. We use data on the members of the Lower House
elected between 1996 and 2005. We choose the members of the Lower House because it has
more legislative power. After 1996, the Japanese Lower House employs a mixed-member system
20This interpretation follows Besley, Persson and Sturn (2010).
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with 200 members elected under Proportional Representation (PR), and 300 members elected
from single-member districts. After 2002, the number of seats for the PR tier was reduced to
180. Our analysis excludes members elected from the PR tier. We exclude the period before
1996 from the analysis in order to hold the effect of electoral system constant.
3.1 Fiscal Transfers
We test the first hypothesis by examining the flow of intergovernmental transfers to municipal-
ities. We use panel data that include biographical and electoral information of representatives
elected for the Lower House in 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005 and fiscal and socioeconomic infor-
mation of municipalities between 1997 and 2007. In Japan, the national government transfers
financial resources to either municipal governments that are located within their districts or
prefectural governments. We focus on municipalities, but our supplementary analysis using
the prefecture-level data presents similar results to those reported below.21 We also present
an instrument variable estimation in order to address concerns for endogeneity.
We estimate the following model:
[Transfer]id,t = β[Dynasty]d,t−1 + γ1[LDP ]d,t−1 + γ2[Term]d,t−1
+γ3[Margin]d,t−1 + λwid,t + φt + ρid + id,t, (10)
where [Transfer]id,t denotes a log of the amount of fiscal transfers from the national govern-
ment to municipality i in district d in year t. The amount of government transfer is the sum
of two broad categories of governmental transfers, namely the local allocation tax grant and
21The results are presented in the appendix. There are 47 prefectures in Japan. Prefectures are similar to U.S.
states, but prefectures possess less autonomy than states. Electoral districts do not cross prefecture boundaries and
each prefecture elects at least two representatives.
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the national treasury disbursement.22 [Transfer]id,t is a per capita amount and is measured
in 1,000 yen.23
[Dynasty]d,t−1 in (10) is our key explanatory variable and equals one if district d in year
t−1 is represented by a dynastic legislator and zero otherwise. We define “dynastic” legislators
as those whose parent was the member of the Lower House in the past.24 [LDP ]d,t−1 equals
one if a legislator belongs to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and zero otherwise. The
LDP was in power during the period of our study. [Term]d,t−1 denotes the number of previous
terms of the legislator for the Lower House. [Margin]d,t−1 denotes the margin of victory.
The vector wj,t includes per capita income, the fiscal strength index, the total size of pop-
ulation, the proportion of population under 15 years old and over 65 years old, the proportion
of population in the agricultural sector and service sector, the degree of urbanization and
population density.25 The financial strength index measures the ratio of municipal financial
revenue to financial demand. When the revenue is exactly equal to the anticipated expen-
diture, the index becomes one. The scores below one denote that the demand surpasses the
revenue, while the scores above one denote that the revenue surpasses the demand. The degree
of urbanization is measured by the ratio of population living in Density Inhabited Districts
(DID). ρid and φt are municipality and year fixed effects, respectively. id,t is a municipality-
year specific error term.26 The number of municipalities in Japan was slightly more than 3,300
22The same measure of fiscal transfer is used by Horiuchi and Saito (2003).
23Our prefecture-level analysis allows us to use other measures of fiscal transfers. The results are presented in the
appendix.
24The average percentage of dynastic legislators elected in each election is about 25%. In this paper, we focus on
the inheritance of legislative and electoral advantages within a family, yet other types of inheritance may occur in
Japan. For example, the secretaries of politicians often inherit some of these advantages from their boss.
25The per capita income, the population size, and the population density are logged in the following analysis.
The population-related variables (except for total population) are only available every five years and we linearly
interpolated values for non-census years.
26The financial and socioeconomic data of municipalities are merged with the legislator data. When we merge the
datasets, we take into account the timing of an election and a budget formation. In Japan, electoral districts do
not typically cross municipality lines (with minor exceptions in urban areas), but after the large-scale municipality
mergers in the early 2000s, about 30 municipalities are now split into more than two electoral districts. They are
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until about 2003, but since then the number has dropped to around 1,800 due to large-scale
mergers that happened throughout Japan. In total, our municipality-level data include about
30,000 observations for 11 years.
Table 1 reports estimation results. All standard errors are clustered by municipalities.27
Column (1) in Table 1 shows that municipalities receive more transfers when they are rep-
resented by dynastic legislators compared to when non-dynastic legislators represent them.
The difference is estimated to be statistically significant. The coefficient associated with the
dynastic legislator dummy in column (1) indicates that municipalities expect a 1.5% increase
in the transfer when they are represented by a dynastic legislator. This result offers support
for the first hypothesis.
[Table 1 Here]
This suggests that municipalities receive more transfers from the national government when
they are represented by dynastic legislators. However, one may argue that the relationship is
spurious. For example, suppose that an area with a deteriorating economic situation elects
a dynastic legislator because it expects him to secure more grants to improve its economic
condition. Further, this area may receive more transfers from the government simply because it
has greater financial needs. If this is the case, the effect of dynastic legislators is overestimated.
Alternatively, one may argue that there is a reverse causality (i.e. our dependent variable
determines the presence of dynastic legislators) because an increase in subsidies enhances the
chance of reelecting dynastic legislators who have brought back the money to the district.
Finally, suppose that there is unobservable ability that helps politicians secure more funds to
dropped from the analysis. In addition, when large municipalities in metropolitan areas are divided into multiple
districts, we count the total number of dynastic and LDP legislators elected in the area and divide by the total
number of legislators representing municipalities. For the number of terms and the margin of victory, we simply take
the average of the data for all members representing the area.
27Substantive results do not change even if standard errors are clustered by districts.
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their constituencies. If dynastic politicians tend to have such a trait, our results are likely to
be biased because we are unable to include it in the estimation.
We address these potential concerns for endogeneity by using the gender of the previous
incumbent’s children as an instrumental variable.28 Specifically, we use the fraction of boys
among the predecessor’s children. Given that more than 90 percent of Japanese politicians
is male between 1996 and 2007, if a politician has only daughters, he is unlikely to give his
seat to one of his children. In fact, among 124 politicians coded as dynastic in our dataset,
only 3 are female.29 Thus, the fraction of male children of a politician should be highly and
positively correlated with the chance of dynastic inheritance of his seat. However, the gender
of offsprings (of the previous incumbent) is unlikely to be related to the amount of transfers
in the current period. These two properties make it an ideal instrument.
Let [frac.boy]d, prev be the number of boys divided by the total number of children of
the previous incumbent in district d. We calculate [frac.boy]d, prev as follows; first, for each
politician in our dataset, we checked if the member who served before him or her belonged
to the same party. If not, [frac.boy]d, prev is automatically coded as 0, because dynastic
inheritance of seats cannot happen.30 Second, if the previous incumbent was from the same
party, then we consulted a book called “Jinji Koshin Roku” that lists family information of
notable people in Japan.31
Then we run our first-stage regression as follows:
[Dynasty]d,t−1 = [frac.boy]d, prev + λXid,t + id,t, (11)
28A similar instrument is used in Bennedsen et al. (2007) who study the impact of family CEO successions on
corporate performance.
29Only members elected in single-member districts are included in the calculation.
30We assume that dynastic politicians belong to the same party as their parent does.
31All members of the Diet are listed in the book, but some members refused to give family information to the
publisher. If no family information is available in the book, we then consulted other sources, including the members
of the Diet themselves. When everything fails, we coded [frac.boy]d, prev as 0.
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where Xid,t contains all other independent (i.e. exogenous) variables included in (10). The first
stage regression produces a statistically significant coefficient on [frac.boy]d, prev (β = 0.445,
SE = 0.085), suggesting that it is a valid strong instrument.
We then run our second-stage regression using a fitted value of [Dynasty]d,t−1 in (11). The
results are reported in column (2) in Table 1. The coefficient associated with [Dynasty]d,t−1
is positive and statistically significant. Substantive results do not change even if we use the
gender of firstborn child or the total number of boys as alternative instruments. Estimation
results from IV regressions suggest that the presence of dynastic legislators has a strong causal
impact on the allocation of distributive benefits to municipalities. Column (2) indicates that
municipalities expect a 13% increase in the transfer when they are represented by a dynastic
legislator. In short, our instrumental variable estimation also lends support to the hypothesis
that dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district than non-dynastic legislators.
3.2 Election Returns
The second hypothesis predicts that dynastic candidates have a higher probability of winning
and a higher vote share compared to non-dynastic candidates. We test this hypothesis by
estimating the following model:
[Return]ik = β[Dynasty]ik + γ1[Female]ik + γ2[Age]ik + γ3[Local]ik
+γ4[LDP ]ik + γ5[DPJ ]ik + γ6[Komei]ik
+γ7[Incumbent]ik + γ8[Term]ik + ρk + ik, (12)
where Returnik is either a dichotomous variable that equals one if candidate i wins an election
in district k or a continuous variable that equals the vote shares of candidate i in district k.
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For the dichotomous variable, candidates are assigned 0 even if they gained a seat in the PR
tier after being defeated in a single-member district. The vote share is equal to the number
of candidate i’s votes divided by the total number of eligible votes cast, multiplied by 100. ρk
denotes a district-fixed effect, while ik denotes a candidate-specific error term. With ρk, the
model exploits variation across candidates within a district.
[Dynasty]ik in (12) is equals 1 if candidate i in district k is dynastic. Because it is extremely
challenging to find the dynastic status of those who lost elections, we limit our search to
candidates who ran in the 2005 General Election (N = 989). Thus, in this part of the analysis,
the sample represents candidates who ran in 2005. In addition to [Dynasty]ik, equation (12)
includes several variables that control the effects of demographic and political attributes of
candidates on election returns. [Female]kt equals one if a candidate is female. [Age]kt denotes
the age of candidates in 2005. [Local]kt equals one if a candidate served as a governor, mayor,
or representative at the prefecture- or municipality-level before running for the Lower House
election. [LDP ]ik, [DJP ]ik, and [Komei]ik denote the party affiliation of candidates. [LDP ]ik
equals one if a candidate is from the LDP. [DJP ]ik equals one if a candidate belongs to the
Democratic Party of Japan. [Komei]ik equals one if a candidate belongs to the Komei party.
32
[Incumbent]ik is a dummy variable for the incumbency status of candidates. [Term]ik is the
number of times that the candidate has been elected to the Lower House.
Table 2 presents estimation results. We estimate a logit model when the dependent variable
is the dichotomous variable of winning. Standard errors are clustered by districts. According
to Column (1), the positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with [Dynasty]ik
suggests that dynastic candidates are more likely to win the 2005 election compared to non-
dynastic counterparts. The estimated coefficient in Column (1) suggests that their probability
32These three parties are the major parties that occupied most of the seats in the Lower House before the 2005
election. The LDP was in power before the election and then predominantly won the election of 2005.
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of winning is 22 percent higher than that of non-dynastic candidates.33 When the vote share
is the dependent variable, we estimate the standard fixed effect model. Column (2) of Table 2
suggests that the coefficient associated with the dynastic status is positive and statistically
significant. That is, dynastic candidates enjoy higher vote shares compared to non-dynastic
counterparts. The estimated coefficient in column (2) implies that the average vote share of
dynastic candidates is 5.273 percentage points higher than that of non-dynastic candidates.
These results show evidence in support for the second hypothesis.
[Table 2 Here]
Some of the control variables in Column (1) have predicted signs. Candidates belonging to
the LDP, incumbent candidates, and candidates serving for longer terms, are more likely to
win than candidates without those characteristics. The probability of winning is 56 percent
higher for the LDP candidates than for the non-LDP candidates, while the probability is 47
percent higher for the incumbents than for the non-incumbents. Column (1) also suggests
that female and younger candidates are more likely to win the seat than are male and older
candidates.
3.3 Policy Outcomes
In the subsection of fiscal transfers, we have shown that municipalities receive more intergov-
ernmental transfers when they are represented by dynastic legislators instead of non-dynastic
legislators. Because our measures of governmental transfers include projects and investment
that should generate economic benefits, such as construction projects, citizens in areas that
receive more transfers should enjoy higher economic performance if those transfers are effec-
33We computed a difference in the predicted probabilities of winning between a dynastic and non-dynastic candi-
date, holding other variables constant.
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tively spent. However, our model suggests that how the increased amount of transfers to
localities affects local economic performance depends on the type of dynastic legislators. Dy-
nastic legislators elected as a result of the dynastic equilibrium allocate part of distribution
to policies that benefit only a small fraction of people in the district. Thus, districts electing
these dynastic legislators tend to display lower economic performance, compared to districts
electing non-dynastic legislators who deliver less transfers than these dynastic legislators but
allocate a distribution to a policy that equally benefits all citizens in the district. In contrast,
districts electing dynastic legislators as a result of the competitive equilibrium display higher
economic performance than do districts electing non-dynastic legislators, because those dy-
nastic legislators deliver more distributions and spend them for equally benefiting the entire
district.
As discussed previously, we predict whether the dynastic or competitive equilibrium appears
in a district electing a dynastic legislator using the amount of electoral resources owned by
that dynastic legislator. More resourceful dynastic candidates set the cost of campaign for
non-dynastic candidates higher and induce VN < cN in Proposition 1, generating the dynastic
equilibrium. Note that dynastic candidates are, on average, more resourceful than non-dynastic
candidates because dynastic candidates can inherit a well-organized supporting group, financial
resources, and the name recognition among constituents from their parent. Thus, a large gap
in electoral resources make it particularly challenging for non-dynastic candidates to fight
against dynastic candidates. In contrast, less resourceful dynastic candidates set the cost of
campaign lower for non-dynastic candidates and induce VN > cN , generating the competitive
equilibrium. Building on this assumption, we hypothesized that compared to districts electing
non-dynastic legislators, districts electing dynastic legislators with abundant resources display
lower economic performance. On the other hand, districts electing dynastic legislators without
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abundant resources display higher economic performance.
For testing this hypothesis, we determine whether dynastic legislators are resourceful or
not by using data on the reported amount of financial resources. Specifically, we rely on
the total amount of family assets of dynastic legislators. We assume that more family assets
allow dynastic candidates to spend more on campaign activities, which results in the higher
cost of campaign for non-dynastic candidates. The data on the assets are available for 1996,
2000, 2003, and 2005. We code dynastic legislators as rich if their family asset exceeds the
mean of the reported assets among all legislators and poor otherwise.34 Our regression analysis
reports that that dynastic candidates own more family assets than do non-dynastic candidates.
Column (1) in Table 3 reports that the difference in the family assets is about 5 million yen,
after controlling for several political and demographic attributes. Column (2) in Table 3 shows
the similar result that dynastic legislators are more resourceful than non-dynastic legislators
when the total amount of campaign revenue is used as a measure of resources.35
As a measure of local economic performance, we use the rate of GDP growth in prefectures.
We expect that prefectures represented by dynastic legislators achieve the lower levels of income
and GDP growth than prefectures represented by non-dynastic legislators. In this subsection,
we use the prefecture-level data because data on economic growth are unavailable at the
municipality-level.36
We estimate the following model:
[Growth]j,t = α[Growth]j,t−1 + β1[P.PoorDynasty]j,t−2 + β2[P.PoorDynasty]j,t−3
+β3[P.RichDynasty]j,t−2 + β4[P.RichDynasty]j,t−3
34The mean equals about 11,000,000 yen.
35The data on campaign revenues are also available for those elected in 1996. The number of observations is 297.
36As noted above, our analysis using the prefecture-level data reports that prefectures receive more transfers when
they are represented by the greater number of dynastic legislators.
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+γ1[P.LDP ]j,t−2 + γ2[P.LDP ]j,t−3 + γ3[Transfer]j,t−1 + γ4[Transfer]j,t−2
+λwj,t + φt + ρjd + j,t, (13)
where [Growth]j,t denotes the annual rate of GDP growth in prefecture j in year t. The right-
hand side of (13) includes the lagged rate of growth, the lagged proportions of dynastic and
LDP legislators, socioeconomic variables, and fixed effects for prefectures and years. Following
prior research on economic growth (Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996), we include the lagged
dependent variable in the right-hand side. Further, we take a log of the growth rate.
[P.PoorDynasty]j,t−2 measures the proportion of dynastic legislators who were elected
in prefecture j in year t − 2 and owned the family assets below the mean of the sample,
while [P.RichDynasty]j,t−2 measures the proportion of dynastic legislators who were elected
in prefecture j in year t−2 and owned the family assets above the mean. [P.PoorDynasty]j,t−3
and [P.RichDynasty]j,t−3 are similarly defined. We use a lag at t− 2 and t− 3 because there
should be a time lag before projects and government investment can affect local economic
performance. Legislators at t determines the amount of transfers at t + 1, which then affects
the rate of income and GDP growth at t + 2 or later. Further, these lags also minimize the
possibility of the reverse causality between the presence of dynastic legislators and economic
performance. In order to calculate the proportions of good and bad dynastic legislators, we first
code each members of the Diet for their dynastic status. Once a legislator’s family background
is coded, we simply sum the number of good and bad dynastic legislators using their asset in
prefecture j in year t−2 (or t−3) and divide it by the total number of lawmakers in prefecture j.
We expect β1 and β2 to be positive and β3 and β4 to be negative. We also include [P.LDP ]j,t−2
and [P.LDP ]j,t−3 to capture the effect of belonging to the government party. These variables
are equal to the proportion of representatives from the Liberal Democratic Party and is defined
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in the same way as [P.PoorDynasty] and [P.RichDynasty].
Equation (13) includes a measure of fiscal transfers from the national government to pre-
fectures. We use a log of the total amount of government transfers per capita at t − 1 and
t − 2. We assume that fiscal transfers are expected to improve the GDP growth rate. Thus,
the coefficients associated with [Transfer] should be estimated to be positive. We use the lag
of [Transfer] at t − 1 and t − 2 because fiscal transfers are not likely to have an immediate
impact on local economic performance.
Additionally, we include wj,t and ρj in order to control the effects of underlying socioeco-
nomic characteristics of prefecture j on [Growth]j,t. These characteristics are likely to affect
the economic performance of prefectures and the election of dynastic legislators. The vector
wj,t includes the rate of unemployment, the fiscal strength index, the total size of population,
the proportion of population under 15 years old and over 65 years old, the proportion of pop-
ulation in the agricultural sector and service sector, the degree of urbanization and population
density.37 ρj controls the effects of unobservable time-invariant characteristics of prefecture j.
Table 4 reports estimated results. We first check that the amount of fiscal transfers is
positively correlated with the GDP growth rate. We include all non-political variables in the
equation and estimate the impact of fiscal transfers. Column (1) of Table 4 indicates that the
amount of transfers at t − 2 has a positive relationship with the GDP growth rate, while the
amount at t − 1 has no statistically significant impact on the growth rate. This result offers
evidence in support for our assumption that fiscal transfers have a lagged positive impact on
local economic performance.
Next, we turn to our analysis of how the presence of dynastic legislators affect the GDP
37As in the previous analysis, GDP, the population size, and the population density are logged in the following
analysis. The population-related variables (except for total population) are only available every five years and we
linearly interpolated values for non-census years.
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growth rate. Before separating dynastic legislators into the two types using their family assets,
we first estimate how the proportion of all dynastic legislators in prefectures affects economic
growth. Column (2) indicates that the proportion of dynastic legislators at t− 3 is estimated
to have a negative and statistically significant impact on the rate of GDP growth.38 The
proportion of dynastic legislators at t − 2 has no statistically significant impact on economic
growth.39
[Table 4 Here]
Column (3) reports the estimated result when we separate dynastic legislators into rich
and poor. Importantly, the proportion of rich dynastic legislators with more family assets at
t − 3 continues to have a negative and statistically impact on the rate of GDP growth. On
the other hand, the proportion of poor dynastic legislators with less family assets at t − 3
has a negative but no statistically significant impact. The negative coefficient associated with
[P.RichDynasty]j,t−3 suggests that dynastic legislators elected as a result of the dynastic equi-
librium suppress the rate of economic growth by spending distributive benefits in an inefficient
manner. Dynastic legislators elected as a result of the competitive equilibrium do not neces-
sarily achieve higher economic performance, compared to non-dynastic legislators. In short,
dynastic legislators suppress local economic performance despite the fact they deliver the larger
amount of distributive benefits to their districts. More distributive benefits improve local eco-
nomic performance, yet dynastic legislators spend the distribution inefficiently, which in turn
suppresses the growth rate in their districts.
38The results hold even when the average margin of victory and number of previous winnings are included in the
models.
39The proportion of dynastic legislators at t− 1 has no significant impact on economic performance.
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4 CONCLUSION
This paper examines how politicians with inherited political resources affect the level of elec-
toral competition and policy decisions. Our model predicts that dynastic politicians have a
higher probability of winning in elections, but yield less economic benefits for the majority of
constituents in the district once elected. Our empirical analysis using data from Japan offers
several notable findings. First, dynastic politicians enjoy the legislative and electoral advan-
tages over non-dynastic counterparts. Second, dynastic candidates enjoy a higher probability
of winning and a higher vote share than non-dynastic candidates. Third and most importantly,
the areas represented by dynastic legislators receive a larger amount of discretionary grants
than the areas represented by non-dynastic legislators, yet the increased transfers do not boost
economic performance in the area. Rather, prefectures face worse economic performance when
represented by dynastic legislators.
This study makes two contributions. First, as consistent with recent research, our analysis
shows that the types of politicians play an important role in the democratic policy-making
process. Politicians are characterized by different abilities, resources, and preferences. Their
personal characteristics constrain how they act in the policy-making process, resulting in differ-
ent policy choices. The findings in this study suggests that exclusive attention to institutional
structures does not always advance our understanding of the democratic policy-making. In
addition, along with other previous works, this study shows that the citizen candidate model
offers a useful framework for analyzing the role of politician types.
Second, our research implies that political dynasties have a negative consequence for demo-
cratic policy-making in Japan. Dynastic politicians may be socially inefficient because their
electoral advantage deters non-dynastic candidates from running for office, even if constituents
prefer non-dynastic candidates to dynastic ones. Further, the large presence of dynastic leg-
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islators may result in less optimal policies for the majority of Japanese citizens. The similar
discussion can be applied to other countries with a considerable presence of political dynasties.
This research leaves some questions for future research. Our model can be extended to
predict the behavior of other politicians with electoral and legislative advantages. In Japan,
for example, dynastic candidates are a typical example of such candidates, but other types of
legislators, such as former local politicians and politician’s secretary, are likely to have similar
characteristics to dynastic candidates.40 It is also important to extend the model to other
countries with different political systems and culture.
40Former local politicians are likely to have an electoral advantage in the district, but unlikely to have a bargaining
advantage in the legislature. According to our model, a lack of one of these advantages will reduce cases with the
dynastic equilibrium. Politician’s secretary may have both of the advantages and often inherit a district from their
boss.
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APPENDIX 1: The Variables in the Model
Variables Definitions
dD, dN Expected amount of distribution
λD, λN Ratio of rents
v Benefit from holding office
cD, cN Costs of running
η Fraction of citizens benefited by policy y
β Marginal benefit from policy y
α Bargaining power of a dynastic candidate
ωi Idiosyncratic shock of voter i’s preference (ωi ∼ Unif [γ − 12φ , γ + 12φ ])
γ Aggregate shock of voters’ preference (γ ∼ Unif [− 1
2ξ
, 1
2ξ
])
m Number of dynastic legislators in the legislature
L Number of legislators in the legislature
VD, VN Expected payoff in a competitive equilibrium
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APPENDIX 2: The Sources of Data
Fiscal transfer: Shichosonbetsu Kessan Jokyo Shirabe (Report on the Condition of Munic-
ipalities’ Balance Sheet) published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communica-
tions.
Biographical information of legislators: For those elected in 1996, we used data compiled
by Kabashima (2000). Because Kabashima’s data covers only up to 1996, we updated
his dataset for more recent lawmakers in two ways. As for conservative members of the
Diet, we supplemented information with the data collected by Asano (2006). Masahiko
Asano generously shared his data with us. Most conservative legislators belong to the
Liberal Democratic Party. For the rest of the representatives, we consulted booklets
called “Kokkai Binran”(Diet Manual) to fill in the dynastic information.
For those who lost the 2005 election, we consulted archives of various newspapers for
candidate profiles. Because dynastic legislators are of great interest to the Japanese
general public, newspaper articles mentioned their dynastic status in most cases. When
newspapers did not carry candidate profiles, we consulted other sources, such as their
web sites and biographical accounts by others.
Election returns: Japan Election Data compiled by Setsufumi Mizusaki and Yuki Mori (Var-
ious years).
Social and economic data of prefectures and municipalities: Shakai Jinko Toukei Taikei
(System of Social and Demographic Statistics) published by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications.
Assets: Newspaper reports.
Campaign revenue: Kabashima (2000).
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APPENDIX 3: Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Municipality-level Data
Mean SD Min Max
Logged Total Transfer (per capita) 5.270 0.918 0.755 8.908
Dynastic Legislator t−1 0.274 0.445 0.000 1.000
LDP Legislator t−1 0.695 0.459 0.000 1.000
Number of Previous Terms t−1 4.666 3.186 1.000 16.000
Margin of Victory t−1 0.196 0.163 0.000 0.791
Fiscal Strength Index 0.438 0.288 0.040 3.010
Logged Per Capita Income 8.027 0.134 7.576 10.590
Logged Population Size 9.556 1.337 5.310 15.108
Population Under Age 15 0.142 0.023 0.033 0.261
Population Over Age 65 0.245 0.073 0.065 0.575
Population in Agriculture 0.073 0.060 0.000 0.497
Population in Service 0.271 0.050 0.124 0.630
Urbanization 0.192 0.304 0.000 1.000
Logged Population Density 0.639 1.629 -4.175 5.296
Number of Observations 29856
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics for District-level Data
Mean SD Min Max
Win 0.303 0.460 0.000 1.000
Vote share 30.330 19.236 0.364 73.618
Dynastic candidate 0.113 0.317 0.000 1.000
Female candidate 0.127 0.334 0.000 1.000
Age of candidate 50.329 10.864 25.000 81.000
Former local politician 0.224 0.417 0.000 1.000
LDP candidate 0.292 0.455 0.000 1.000
DPJ candidate 0.294 0.456 0.000 1.000
Komei candidate 0.009 0.095 0.000 1.000
Incumbent 0.422 0.494 0.000 1.000
Number of previous terms 1.556 2.436 0.000 15.000
Number of Observations 989
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics for Prefecture-level Data
Mean SD Min Max
GDP Growth Rate -0.001 0.019 -0.067 0.088
Proportion Dynastic Legislator t−1 0.252 0.202 0.000 0.750
Proportion Rich Dynastic Legislator t−1 0.094 0.128 0.000 0.667
Proportion Poor Dynastic Legislator t−1 0.158 0.180 0.000 0.750
Proportion LDP Legislator t−1 0.658 0.270 0.000 1.000
Average Number of Previous Winnings t−1 4.445 1.373 1.833 9.667
Average Margin of Victory t−1 0.180 0.086 0.016 0.470
Unemployment Rate 0.089 0.025 0.046 0.221
Fiscal Strength Index 0.443 0.193 0.197 1.319
Logged Per Capita Income 7.919 0.141 7.593 8.472
Logged Population Size 14.502 0.736 13.305 16.362
Population Under Age 15 0.146 0.012 0.113 0.210
Population Over Age 65 0.202 0.033 0.110 0.282
Population in Agriculture 0.073 0.038 0.004 0.158
Population in Service 0.631 0.053 0.518 0.787
Urbanization 0.506 0.186 0.240 0.994
Logged Population Density 1.207 0.967 -0.342 4.066
Number of Observations 517
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APPENDIX 4: The Effect of Dynastic Legislators on
Fiscal Transfers to Prefectures
In addition to our municipality-level analysis, we also tested the first hypothesis using the
prefectural-level data. This supplementary analysis is important because the prefectural-level
data allow us to define the amount of fiscal transfer in a variety of ways. The model for the
prefecture-level analysis is given by:
[Transfer]j,t = β[P.Dynasty]j,t−1 + γ1[P.LDP ]j,t−1 + γ2[A.Term]j,t−1
+γ3[A.Margin]j,t−1 + λwj,t + φt + ρj + j,t, (14)
where [Transfer]j,t is the amount of fiscal transfers from the national government to prefecture
j in year t; ρj is prefecture fixed effects; φt is year fixed effects; and j,t is a prefecture-year
specific error term.
We develop four measures of [Transfer]j,t. The first measure is the total amount of
government transfers.41 In Japan, there are two broad categories of government transfers. The
first category is the local allocation tax grant (chiho kofuzei kofukin), which is mainly spent
for defraying the cost of services provided by local governments. Note that the amount of the
local allocation tax grant is determined so that it achieves a certain level of financial equality
among local governments. The second category is the national treasury disbursement (kokko
shishutsukin). This is a specific-purpose grant that defrays the cost of specific programs such
as public works, social security, and education. As our first dependent variable, we use the sum
of these two types of grants. This measure is identical to the one used for our municipality-level
analysis.
The second measure captures the amount of discretionary transfers from the national gov-
ernment. In general, the national treasury disbursement is more discretionary in nature than
the local allocation tax grant. Yet the national treasury disbursement also includes some
programs that are allocated to cover obligatory expenses such as social assistance expenses
and public debt payments. Because these programmatic expenses are allocated on the basis
of formula and unlikely to reflect political influence, we exclude subsidies for the obligatory
expenses to create our second measure, “capital transfers.” The same measure is used by Doi
41The same measure is used by Horiuchi and Saito (2003) and Meyer and Naka (1998).
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and Ashiya (1997). The obligatory expenses are described as “mandatory and difficult to cut
down at the discretion of individual local governments” by the Japanese government (White
Paper on Local Public Finance (2007): 18). There are three categories of expenses: “obligatory
expenses”, “investment expenses” (also called “capital transfers”), and “other expenses.” Ac-
cording to the classification by the Japanese government, “capital transfers” include transfers
for construction expenses, disaster restoration, and assistance for the unemployed. Following
this definition, our second measure of the dependent variable contains the sum of these three
programs.
The third measure of [Transfer]j,t is the amount of transfers for construction projects,
which constitute most of the “capital transfers.” Some research (e.g., Woodall, 1996) indicates
that funds for construction projects are the most discretionary item among the programs
categorized as “capital transfers.” The same measure is used by Doi and Ashiya (1997).
Another way to measure the amount of government transfers received by local residents
is to look at the amount of public investment (i.e., public spending). Public investment
captures larger activities in size than our second or third measures, and includes all activities to
improve conditions of local social infrastructures such as transportation, residence, agriculture,
industrial activities, and education facilities. Another difference is that public investment is
funded by either the national, prefecture, or municipal government, while capital transfers
include the amount of subsidies only from the national government. About one fourth of the
total public investment is funded by the national government.
The data on fiscal transfers are taken from the Todofukenbetsu Kessan Jokyo Shirabe
(Report on the Condition of Prefectures’ Balance Sheet) published by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications. We collect financial data for fiscal years 1997-2007 on the total
amount of transfers, capital transfers, and funds for construction projects. The data on pub-
lic investment for social infrastructures are taken from Gyosei Toshi Jisseki (The Amount
of Public Investment) and available for fiscal years 1997-2005. Each year corresponds to a
Japanese fiscal year that starts in April and ends in March. All of these measures are per
capita and in 1000 yen. They are also adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.
[P.Dynasty]j,t−1 in the equation is our key explanatory variable. It measures the proportion
of dynastic legislators elected in prefecture j. We first code each members of the Diet for their
dynastic status. We define “dynastic” legislators as those whose parent was the member of
the Lower House in the past. Once a legislator’s family background is coded, we simply sum
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the number of dynastic legislators in prefecture j in year t and divide it by the total number
of lawmakers in prefecture j to calculate the [P.Dynasty]j,t−1 variable. This variable ranges
from 0 to 0.75. Because the budget in year t is determined by the members of the Diet serving
in year t− 1, this variable is lagged by one year. We expect that as the proportion of dynastic
legislators increases, the amount of fiscal transfers becomes larger. Thus, the expected sign of
β is positive.
We also include several political variables in the estimation to isolate the effect of having
dynastic legislators. [P.LDP ]j,t−1 is included in the model in order to control for the effect of
belonging to the government party. The variable measures the proportion of representatives
from the Liberal Democratic Party and is defined in the same way as [P.Dynasty]j,t−1. The
LDP was in power during the period of our study. [A.Term]j,t−1 denotes the average number
of terms, and [A.Margin]j,t−1 is the average vote margins for legislators in prefecture j. The
data on election results are taken from Mizusaki (2005).
Underlying socioeconomic characteristics of prefecture j are controlled by wj,t and ρj . The
vector wj,t includes time-varying characteristics such as prefecture-GDP, per capita income,
the rate of unemployment, the fiscal strength index, the total size of population, the proportion
of population under 15 years old and over 65 years old, the proportion of population in the
agricultural sector and service sector, the degree of urbanization, and population density.
GDP, the per capita income, the population size, and the population density are logged in
the following analysis. The population-related variables (except for total population) are
only available every five years and we linearly interpolated values for non-census years. The
financial strength index indicates the ratio of municipal financial revenue to financial demand.
The higher scores denote higher balance between the revenue and the demand. The degree
of urbanization is measured by the ratio of population living in Density Inhabited Districts
(DID). Social and economic data of each prefecture between 1997 and 2007 are taken from
Shakai Jinko Toukei Taikei (System of Social and Demographic Statistics) published by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. ρj controls the effects of unobservable
time-invariant characteristics of prefecture j.
Table A.4 reports estimation results. The dependent variable is the amount of total trans-
fers in columns (1). We use the amount of capital transfers in columns (2), and funds for
construction projects in columns (3). Columns (4) present results when the amount of public
investment is used as the dependent variable. All standard errors are clustered by prefectures.
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The estimated coefficient on the Proportion Dynastic Legislator variable in column (1) indi-
cates that the larger presence of dynastic legislators has a positive and statistically significant
impact on the total amount of intergovernmental transfers. That is, prefectures receive a larger
amount of fiscal transfers from the national government as the proportion of dynastic legisla-
tors increases. The same pattern is found in columns (2), (3), and (4): The greater presence
of dynastic legislators in the prefecture is associated with more capital transfers, more funds
for construction works, and more public investments for social infrastructure.
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Table A.4: The Effect of Dynastic Legislators on Fiscal Transfers to Prefectures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Capital Construction Investment
Proportion Dynastic Legislator t−1 0.049* 0.176** 0.156* 0.152**
(0.032) (0.097) (0.094) (0.067)
Proportion LDP Legislator t−1 −0.032** −0.027 −0.021 −0.008
(0.018) (0.049) (0.049) (0.038)
Average Number of Previous Winnings t−1 −0.000 −0.017** −0.007 −0.007*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Average Margin of Victory t−1 0.035 0.223** 0.143 0.052
(0.066) (0.122) (0.116) (0.131)
Logged GDP 0.264 1.085* 1.069** 1.553**
(0.422) (0.700) (0.622) (0.676)
Unemployment Rate 2.478** −1.272 −0.175 −0.670
(1.022) (2.419) (2.267) (1.955)
Fiscal Strength Index −1.350** 0.025 0.261 0.486**
(0.474) (0.349) (0.337) (0.274)
Logged Per Capita Income −0.200 −0.559 −0.261 −0.780**
(0.306) (0.554) (0.510) (0.356)
Logged Population Size 5.449 15.247 24.057* 33.385*
(6.781) (13.245) (17.337) (20.066)
Population Under Age 15 1.639 5.336 5.517 −4.296
(2.547) (5.068) (5.255) (3.344)
Population Over Age 65 −4.395** −4.424* −2.169 −1.960
(1.436) (3.225) (3.228) (2.874)
Population in Agriculture 4.829** −3.620 −4.868 3.812
(2.408) (5.066) (5.088) (4.034)
Population in Service −0.482 −10.193** −8.614** −1.803
(1.636) (3.048) (3.125) (2.247)
Urbanization 0.767 2.304** 3.155** −0.495
(0.615) (1.294) (1.227) (1.043)
Logged Population Density −7.416 −18.313* −26.072* −36.154**
(6.644) (13.543) (17.620) (20.268)
R2 0.994 0.980 0.985 0.975
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by prefectures. Estimates are based on the prefecture-
level data from 1997 to 2007. The dependent variable in Columns (1) is the total amount of fiscal transfer per capita from the national
government to prefectures. The dependent variable is the amount of fiscal transfer per capita for capital transfer in Columns (2), for
construction works in Columns (3), and for public investment in in Columns (4). The dependent variables are logged. Prefecture and
year fixed effects are included in the models. The number of observations is 517 in Columns (1) through (3) and 423 in Column (4). ∗∗
p < .05 and ∗ p < .10 (one-tailed tests).
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Table 1: The Effect of Dynastic Legislators on Fiscal Transfers to Municipalities
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Dynastic legislator t−1 0.015** 0.125**
(0.007) (0.053)
LDP legislator t−1 0.003 0.000
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of previous terms t−1 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Margin of victory t−1 0.015 0.004
(0.012) (0.013)
Fiscal strength index −1.420** −1.409**
(0.199) (0.187)
Logged per capita income −0.036 −0.019
(0.072) (0.068)
Logged population size −0.041 −0.047
(0.049) (0.047)
Population under age 15 −0.214 −0.129
(0.428) (0.411)
Population over age 65 0.326 0.356*
(0.284) (0.272)
Population in agriculture 0.181 0.253
(0.239) (0.233)
Population in service −1.119** −1.222**
(0.368) (0.360)
Urbanization −0.083 −0.103
(0.130) (0.116)
Logged population density −0.277** −0.280**
(0.023) (0.022)
N 29854 29832
R2 0.980 0.410
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by municipalities. Estimates are based
on the municipality-level data from 1997 to 2007. The dependent variable is the total amount of fiscal transfer per
capita from the national government to municipalities. The dependent variable is logged for estimation. Municipality
and year fixed effects are included in the models. ∗∗ p < .05 and ∗ p < .10 (one-tailed tests).
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Table 2: The Effect of Dynastic Candidates on the Election Returns in 2005
(1) (2)
Win Vote Share
Dynastic candidate 1.703** 5.273**
(0.678) (1.370)
Female candidate 1.358** 0.563
(0.627) (0.881)
Age of candidate −0.102** −0.170**
(0.027) (0.041)
Former local politician 0.462 2.746**
(0.658) (0.974)
LDP candidate 3.899** 27.270**
(0.482) (1.209)
DPJ candidate −0.739* 17.497**
(0.536) (1.133)
Komei candidate 2.345 21.188**
(1.992) (1.818)
Incumbent 4.045** 12.431**
(0.621) (1.315)
Number of previous terms 0.581** 1.228**
(0.167) (0.279)
Pseudo R2 or R2 0.637 0.884
Note: Table entries are logit regression coefficients in Column (1) and linear regression coefficients in Column (2)
with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by districts. Estimates are based on
candidates running for the 2005 Lower House election. The dependent variables are a binary variable that equals
one if a candidate won the election in Column (1) and the percent of vote share in Column (2). The number of
observations is 989. District fixed effects are included in the models. ∗ p < .05 and ∗ p < .10 (one-tailed tests).
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Table 3: Dynastic Legislators and Financial Resources
(1) (2)
Family Campaign
Asset Revenue
Dynastic legislator 5.367** 1.735**
(2.373) (0.875)
Female legislator 1.372 −3.568**
(3.719) (1.950)
Age of legislator 0.159* −0.023
(0.105) (0.039)
Former local politician −0.880 −0.598
(1.192) (0.649)
LDP legislator 1.560 5.731**
(1.275) (1.664)
DPJ legislator 1.849 3.119**
(1.950) (1.733)
Number of previous terms 0.643 0.245**
(0.497) (0.143)
1996 1.816**
(1.055)
2000 1.281
(1.099)
2003 −0.763
(0.598)
R2 0.082 0.227
N 1198 297
Note: Table entries are linear regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by prefectures. Estimates are based on winners elected for the 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005 Lower House
elections. Estimates are based on winners elected for the 1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005 Lower House elections in Column
(1) and in the 1996 election in Column (2). The dependent variable in Column (1) is the total asset in 1,000,000
yen, while the dependent variable in Column (2) is the total campaign revenue in 1,000,000 yen. Prefecture fixed
effects are included in the models. ∗∗ p < .05 and ∗ p < .10 (one-tailed tests).
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Table 4: The Effect of Dynastic Legislators on Economic Growth at the Prefecture-Level
(1) (2) (3)
Logged GDP t−1 −0.428** −0.436** −0.437**
(0.063) (0.062) (0.062)
Logged Total Transfer t−1 −0.014 −0.011 −0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Logged Total Transfer t−2 0.048** 0.045** 0.045**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Proportion Dynastic Legislator t−2 0.004
(0.009)
Proportion Dynastic Legislator t−3 −0.017**
(0.008)
Proportion Rich Dynastic Legislator t−2 0.000
(0.011)
Proportion Rich Dynastic Legislator t−3 −0.011
(0.009)
Proportion Poor Dynastic Legislator t−2 0.007
(0.011)
Proportion Poor Dynastic Legislator t−3 −0.020**
(0.009)
Proportion LDP Legislator t−2 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Proportion LDP Legislator t−3 −0.001 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Unemployment Rate −0.834** −0.854** −0.853**
(0.312) (0.301) (0.300)
Fiscal Strength Index 0.065 0.066 0.064
(0.063) (0.065) (0.067)
Logged Population Size 3.243** 3.148** 3.213**
(1.287) (1.338) (1.335)
Population Under Age 15 −0.544 −0.615 −0.591
(0.541) (0.518) (0.524)
Population Over Age 65 −0.088 −0.072 −0.095
(0.307) (0.310) (0.307)
Population in Agriculture −0.478 −0.488 −0.492
(0.476) (0.494) (0.498)
Population in Service −0.307 −0.339 −0.337
(0.365) (0.375) (0.373)
Urbanization 0.105 0.116 0.115
(0.164) (0.158) (0.155)
Logged Population Density −3.059** −2.956** −3.023**
(1.310) (1.365) (1.363)
Constant −36.411** −35.005** −35.841**
(17.349) (18.048) (18.006)
R2 0.526 0.531 0.531
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by prefectures. Estimates are based
on the prefecture-level data from 1997 to 2007. The dependent variable in Column (1) the rate of total GDP growth.
The dependent variables in Column (2) through (4) are the rate of growth in the primary, secondary, and tertiary
industries. Prefecture and year fixed effects are included in the models. The number of observations is 517. ∗∗ p <
.05 and ∗ p < .10
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Figure 1: The Existence of Equilibria
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